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Standard  economics  omits  the  role  of  narratives  (the  stories  that people  tell  themselves
and  others)  when  they  make  all kinds  of  decisions.  Narratives  play  a role  in understanding
the  environment;  focusing  attention;  predicting  events;  motivating  action;  assigning  social
roles and identities;  deﬁning  power  relations;  and  establishing  and  conveying  social  norms.
This paper  describes  the role  narratives  play  in decision  making,  as  it also  juxtaposes  this
description  against  the backdrop  of  the  Bolshevik-spawned  narrative  that  played  a  critical
role  in the  history  of  Russia  and  the  Soviet  Union  in the  20th Century.
© 2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
This article is concerned with the importance of narratives in decision making, particularly economic decision making.
We may  characterize a “narrative” as a sequence of causally linked events and their underlying sources, unfolding through
time, which may  be used as a template for interpreting our ongoing experience (Graesser et al., 1980; Bruner, 1991). The
underlying sources of the events include, among many other things, the goals of the narrative’s characters (Beach, 2010;
Schank and Abelson, 1977), their emotions (Oatley, 1992) and identities (McAdams, 2001). Narratives are simpliﬁed accounts
of events that tend to be crucially concerned with issues of balance – between the needs of the individual versus the social
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roup, between material and non-material aspirations, between self-interest and altruism, between humankind and nature,
nd so on. These issues are of central importance, since narratives implicitly recognize that balance in these senses is essential
o human well-being.
Narratives serve a variety of purposes, which can be shown to have important implications for decision making. From the
any functions of narratives that have been described in various literatures of the social sciences and humanities (especially
sychology, sociology, anthropology, narratology and literary criticism), this article highlights the following interrelated roles
f narratives in decision formation:
. Understanding the environment: Narratives help us gain a conceptual understanding of our internal and external environ-
ment. They do so by providing simple mental models whereby we  can identify causal relations that enable us to account for
past and present events in terms of antecedent events. In particular, narratives provide alternative scenarios that enable
us to envision past and present events in terms of what happened previously. They thereby play a role in our (conscious
or unconscious) adoption of our causal explanation of past and present events, where the adoption may  depend on moti-
vational criteria such as maximizing explanatory power, minimizing potentially harmful misinterpretations, minimizing
anxiety, and so on.
. Focusing attention: Narratives focus our attention on particular types of events and particular causal relations concerning
these events. Narratives thereby have a strong inﬂuence on our economic decisions, since we  can only make choices with
regard to the domain of possibilities that lies within our ﬁeld of attention. This attentional ﬁeld is generally quite limited
relative to the complete domain of possibilities. Narratives serve as a ﬁlter for screening data in this regard.
. Predicting events:  By making particular causal relations salient, narratives bring these relationships into our attentional
ﬁeld when we predict events, including when we predict the future implications of our current actions.
. Motivating action:  In bringing particular causal relations to our attention, narratives activate particular motives in us.2 Our
motives are diverse and may  include self-interested wanting, concern for the well-being of others, afﬁliation with others in
our social groups, achievement seeking, status seeking, anger, fear, play, sexual gratiﬁcation, and more. Different motives
are associated with different objectives. Narratives interpret people’s intentions and thereby inﬂuence the motivations
that become activated. By helping us predict the future, narratives help us reduce our anxiety in the face of uncertainty.
. Social assignments and identities: Narratives assign social roles to people, placing them into well-deﬁned relationships
with respect to one another. In doing so, narratives help establish and maintain people’s social identities which, in turn,
shape their motives and objectives.
. Power relationships: By assigning social roles, narratives establish and maintain power relationships among people.
Narratives fulﬁll this role when they gain legitimacy within speciﬁed social groups, deﬁning hierarchies of legitimate
power. Having gained legitimacy, the resulting power relationships may  be reinforced or even replaced by instruments
of coercion.
. Social norms. Narratives teach people social norms and furthermore help explain why  we ourselves should obey those
norms, and where and when we should punish others who  disobey them.
These roles of narratives are irrelevant to mainstream economic analysis for a simple reason. By explaining economic deci-
ions under the assumptions of Homo Economicus – internally coherent, self-interested, context independent and temporally
table preferences; and means-end rationality applied to a determinate, objectively observable environment – mainstream
conomic analysis leaves no role for narratives to play in shaping people’s objectives and constraints. The empirical deﬁ-
iencies of this model of human nature have been highlighted by various disciplines (including psychology, neuroscience,
nthropology, sociology, cognitive science and evolutionary biology), leading to a variety of conceptual extensions in behav-
oral economics. Yet behavioral economics has thus far also had little to say about the role of narratives, leading us to believe
hat further signiﬁcant modiﬁcations of our conception of human nature are necessary before the impact of narratives on
conomic decisions can be appreciated.
An effective way of understanding the roles of narratives is to consider a particularly powerful narrative in recent history:
he one underlying the rise of the Soviet economic system. There can be little doubt about the importance of narrative in
ransforming economic life in Russia and its satellite countries, for without a story that served to explain the need for a
adical transformation, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other major Russian political ﬁgures could not have induced others to act
n accordance with their visions. By examining the role that narrative played in establishing and maintaining the Soviet
conomic system, we can illustrate dramatically the various roles that narratives play in shaping economic decisions. The
istoric signiﬁcance of these roles makes it easy to appreciate the need for including narratives in economic analysis.
In what follows, we will offer an account of the Soviet economic system (in italics), interrupted by commentaries explain-
ng the various roles that narratives play in decision making. It is important to emphasize that our account of the Soviet
ystem – like all historical accounts – is itself a narrative. In fact, it is a disputed narrative, one that has gained much credence
n the West, but was obviously not shared by the people involved in establishing the Soviet system.
2 In addition, our motives also inﬂuence the causal relations that are brought to our attention and thereby inﬂuence the narratives we adopt.
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1. An opening
Let’s begin on the smallest scale, with a joke, from the later, somewhat-less-severe years of the Communist rule.
A man  walks into a grocery store with a notebook. “Do you have sausage?” “No.” He makes a note. “Bread?” “No.” He makes
another note. “20 years ago, they would have shot you for making notes like that,” says a woman waiting in line. “No bullets
either,” he writes.
This joke is only 49 words. But it is indicative of how the Soviet system worked at every scale. This turns out to be an appropriate
opening for our historical account, because it frames our understanding of the Soviet economic system in terms of its ability to
satisfy people’s basic material needs. Furthermore, as the system was found inadequate by this criterion, the joke sets us on course
for two focal questions: In view of its unfolding inadequacy, how did the system manage to get established in the ﬁrst place? And
once its inadequacy had become apparent, how did it maintain itself in power? In these ways the joke sets the terms of reference
for what constitutes an understanding of the relevant environment. The narrative now begins to provide such an understanding.3
2. The Tsar abdicates
Physicists have gleaned important features of the current Universe from its features at the time of the Big Bang. Remarkably,
similar inferences can be drawn in political revolutions, which, like the Big Bang, also occur in times of chaos. Yet more remarkably,
to a surprising degree, individual national leaders who have lived abroad often affect their countries for generations beyond the
revolution by creating the vision of “who we are.” To name a few examples: Benjamin Franklin, home from England; Ayatollah
Khomeini, home from Paris; Gandhi and Nehru in India, and Jinnah in Pakistan, home from their English educations. In Russia, of
course, we  are thinking of Lenin, home from Switzerland. We  shall see that those empty shelves and the generous use of bullets
in the joke were like almost everything else in Soviet history, a result of the “story” he fostered in that primordial time, regarding
what was to be done.
The Russian Empire in 1917 was in crisis: militarily, economically, and constitutionally; and also, in the personal life of its
leader, Tsar Nicholas II. The military crisis was the result of a foolish decision. In late June 1914, on a visit to the border town
of Sarajevo to dedicate a state museum, the Austrian Crown Prince (Franz Ferdinand) was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist.
When the Austrians responded by invading Serbia,4 the Tsar fulﬁlled his treaty obligations: he joined the Serbs. In short order the
Germans joined the Austrians; the Allies joined the Russians; and the war raged on. At the front, Russian casualties, prisoners and
deaths rose into the millions. Behind the lines, famine was breaking out. The Tsar, rather than distance himself from these problems,
waded in further. He made himself Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, headquartered at the Front.
A further unwise decision double-downed Nicholas’ squander of legitimacy. A devoted family man, he had married an accom-
plished, devoutly religious young woman: Alexandra of Hesse, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria. This prestigious pedigree came,
however, with a hidden liability. Victoria was the carrier of hemophilia, and Alexandra’s and Nicholas’ son, Alexei, was afﬂicted
with this painful genetic disease. A slightly hippie friend introduced Alexandra, in her cup of troubles, to a priest, Rasputin, known
for his “hypnotic” powers. When this wildman, with his remarkable hypnotic eyes, visited the Palace, Alexei’s pains abated (perhaps
calming the Tsarina and thereby acting as an analgesic on the boy’s nerve-related pain). Rasputin’s inﬂuence through Alexandra on
state policies—not to mention his voracious appetite for the wives of the nobles—rose to be a public affair. Five nobles put him out
of the way—his body parked beneath an ice ﬂoe in the Neva. But the military losses, famines, strikes, and Nicholas’ unpopularity
due to Rasputin were too much. When the troops disobeyed orders to quell a general strike in St. Petersburg, he had to abdicate:
on March 2, 1917.
The baton of power was assumed by the ﬂedgling elected parliament, the Duma, which in the current form had been only
grudgingly convened by Nicholas eleven years earlier. It now asserted itself to be the Provisional Government of Russia. Not only
did it lack historical legitimacy; to make matters worse, the new leaders continued the abortive war. In the capital city, on the
left, the workers’ elected council (the Petrograd Soviet) immediately claimed dual authority. On the right, in the summer, the
provisional government had to stave off an attempt by General Kornilov to re-establish order in St. Petersburg. But these were just
two of many instances of general disorder amid massive unemployment; soaring food prices; multiple strikes; and a mutinous
military.
2.1. Understanding the environmentObserve how the narrative helps us understand the relevant environment (the ﬁrst of the six roles summarized above).
Speciﬁcally, it helps us understand how the Soviet system got established by suggesting a simple answer: a power vacuum
into which the Bolsheviks stepped.
3 For historical background on the relevant period of Russian history, see for example Conquest (1987), Fitzpatrick (1994, ch. 2), Malia (1994), Kort (1996),
Ulam (1998), Kenez (1999, ch. 2), Service (2000) and Cambridge History of Russia (2006, vol. 3, ch. 4, 5).
4 Nominally they were seeking justice for the death of the heir apparent, but real politique more likely was the real motive, as the Austrians sought to
shore  up their position in the Balkans.
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To clarify how the narrative performs this role, it is useful to start with the most basic components of narratives: categories.
arratives structure our understanding of the environment analogously to the ways categories do, but at a more complex
nd integrative level. Thus, by appreciating how categories structure our perceptions and appraisal of the world, we set the
tage for recognizing the sense-making role of narratives.
We use categories whenever we see a recognizable thing or do a recognizable action. “Bread” and “Bullets” are categories,
or example. Without categories, our environment would be incomprehensible, since we  would be unable to use information
rom one experience (the sight of a piece of bread) to derive implications for another experience (the taste of another piece
f bread), since the two experiences could not be brought into relation with one another.
Since most of our categorizing is performed unconsciously, we are generally not aware that our categories are constructed
o suit our sensorimotor faculties, believing instead that these categories correspond to entities in the real world. In fact,
his notion – that our mental images are imperfect reﬂections of objective entities and that the accuracy of the reﬂection
etermines the truth of our beliefs – has received widespread support from philosophers through the ages, from Plato to
ant; it is known as the “correspondence theory of truth.” According to the associated classical theory of categorization,
eing a member of a category means fulﬁlling certain well-deﬁned conditions, which are independent of the subject doing
he categorizing.
Alas, since the work of Wittgenstein (1953), Rosch and Lloyd (1978), and much subsequent cognitive science, psychology
nd neuroscience research on perception, this theory is now recognized as untenable.5 Instead, scientists have come to realize
hat our categorization schemes are the outcome of the interplay between our sensorimotor faculties and our environment.
or example, we often categorize things in terms of a prototype (the best example of a category, with respect to which other
hings may  be arranged in order to similarity) or an exemplar (a remembered instance of the thing).
In short, our categories are mental constructs that do not simply mirror an objectively observable reality. This is par-
icularly obvious when we categorize abstract entities such as emotions (e.g. anger), social interactions (e.g. enmity),
hysiological states (e.g. a cold) or political constructs (e.g. a legislature), but it also pertains to simple perceptions of
hysical objects (for which the perceived entity has been shown to be the outcome of a combination of optical stimuli and
ognitive schemata).
Narratives may  be characterized as associations of categories, often in terms of causal chains (which are often also
dentiﬁable as categories). Given that categories of things and actions involve a signiﬁcant amount of interpretation, it is
lear that narratives, involving the linkages of categories, are far more interpretative. Our categories of things and actions
end to be stable through time (for example, perceptual data that we interpret as a tree has been interpreted in this way
rom time immemorial), whereas our narratives about the past are often subject to substantial modiﬁcation. The reason
s that our familiar categories have been consistently successful in enabling us to navigate our environment,6 whereas we
ften keep revising our narratives in the hope of improving our navigation.
There are a variety of ways in which narratives help us navigate our environment. Consider a set of events E, which are
elevant to our wellbeing and a set of potential causes C that include a set of our actions X. In this context, narratives may
elp us recognize causal links between E and C, including X, such that
. causes C come maximally close to being necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for E,
. the causal link between C and E involves at least some encoding,
. we are able to identify actions X that lead to events E with particularly favorable/unfavorable outcomes for our well-being,
in order to initiate/avoid such actions,
. we are able to identify actions X that we hope will lead to effective learning opportunities for apprehending necessary or
sufﬁcient conditions C for events E, or to shorter coding to link given conditions C to E,
. we are able to identify actions X, promoting desirable outcomes E and avoiding undesirable outcomes E’, that are com-
patible with our current identities,
. where cooperation among people is required to promote desirable outcomes E and avoid undesirable outcomes E′, we
are able to identify actions X that are communicable to others and consonant with afﬁliation to our social in-groups.
The further removed we are from objective (1), the greater is our perceived uncertainty and our associated sense of
nxiety; the further from objective (2), the more difﬁcult the narrative is to store, process, manipulate and communicate;
he further from objectives (3) and (4), the more helpless we feel; and the further from objective (5), the greater our fear
f identity betrayal; and the further from objective (6), the greater our fear of separation anxiety with respect to the social
roups to which we belong.
What this list implies is that there are many ways for narratives to help us understand our environment, with objective
1) – the only understanding recognized in mainstream economic analysis – being just one of these. The others involve
ulﬁlling a variety of our needs and desires, including empowerment, achievement, afﬁliation, curiosity, and so on. Narrative
xplanations of our environment are not just dispassionate accounts of causes and effects, but are useful as explanations
ecause they enable us to feel good and to avoid feeling bad.
5 For wide-ranging overviews of this topic, see for example Lakoff (1987) and Murphy (2002).
6 Where this has not been the case (as for p¨hlogiston)¨ the categories have been dropped.
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For this reason alone it is clear that narratives play a fundamental sense-making role in economic decision making. Why,
then, has this role of narratives been ignored in traditional economic analysis? Traditional economic analysis is based on
the correspondence theory of truth. Economic models aim to mirror economic reality as closely as possible, for the given
purposes that the models serve (so that, in accord with the principle of Occam’s Razor, they are meant to simplify reality
in all respects that have no bearing on their stated purposes). Economic theories commonly distinguish between “actual”
and “expected” economic variables and between the “real world” and our models of it. Traditional economic analysis does
not recognize that economic models, along with the variables and parameters they contain, are ways of structuring our
understanding of economic activities. Nor does it recognize that an important aspect of the appeal of economic models lies
in the affective properties of their explanations.
3. Lenin and the Bolsheviks
Into this chaos stepped Vladimir (Ulyanov) Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades. They stood out, even among the far left wing,
for their disdain for democracy in all its forms. The naming-event of the Bolshevik party is a tell-tale. In the summer of 1903 the
Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (of Marxist revolutionaries) convened in London. The leaders of the party—Lenin, on the one
side, and his up-to-then good friend, Juliy Martov, on the other—developed a rift. The disagreement, concerning membership rules,
might seem to concern a triviality (such as out of a satire of academia). Lenin wanted party membership reserved to those willing
to sacriﬁce everything themselves, and also expecting such sacriﬁce from others. Martov wanted to admit mere sympathizers, who
supported the Marxist position, if they would “submit to guidance” from leaders. When the meeting ended, the party, already
minuscule relative to its goal of starting the Revolution in Russia, split. Lenin called his own  side the Bolsheviks (the majority)
although they had been the minority in the vote; he called the other side the Mensheviks (the minority). Those names have
stuck to the present day. The episode demonstrates Lenin’s chutzpah. But much more important, it points to the extremism of his
extremism.
Nor was the hard line of Lenin’s stance in London just a momentary aberration. We  can even pick it out when he was
just 19. Young Vladimir was living, with his family, in the lower Volga region, which was in the midst of a terrible drought.
As hundreds of thousands of peasants lay dying¸ his sister Anna and other local intellectuals participated in famine relief.
Lenin not only did not join them; he disapproved. The famine, he said, would hasten the transition to the new socialist order.
Even his ever-worshipful sister Maria was shocked. “He has a different nature from Alexander,” she wrote—Alexander being
Lenin’s older brother, who had been hanged three years earlier for plotting to kill the Tsar. Lenin’s sentiments here were the
precursor to the view that dominated Soviet history: anything was justiﬁed as long as it promoted the Bolshevik heaven on
earth.
From those teenage years Lenin developed his vision regarding how that heaven might be reached. According to Karl Marx
the progression of history was through three stages: ﬁrst, feudalism; then, capitalism; and, ﬁnally, its overthrow to form the
ideal socialist state. For Lenin, however, Russia posed a problem. Being poorer than the capitalist countries to the West, if
Russia were to have a revolution, it would miss the middle stage. Lenin had a remedy: to reach the capitalist state, Rus-
sia should be force-fed industrialized, like a goose brought up to yield foie gras. There needed to be a dictatorship willing
to take any measures to maintain its power and develop industry. This story, as we shall see, was the Lenin legacy to his
homeland.
In early 1917 Lenin, who was in Geneva at the time, decided to return to Russia.
Still at war, the Germans transported him with a pride of his fellow revolutionaries in a sealed armored train across Germany;
from there they took a ferry across the Baltic, and thence traveled onward, to Helsinki, and then south, to St. Petersburg’s Finland
Station. Lenin arrived dramatically on April 3, 1917 (New Calendar), a huge crowd awaiting him.
That crowd reﬂected the Bolsheviks’ increasing support. Workers in Russia, hit especially hard by the manifold economic
problems, were now signiﬁcantly attracted to the Bolsheviks. Their newspaper Pravda had some 80,000 subscribers. In St. Petersburg
Lenin and his comrades made connections with workers and, especially, with sympathizers in the armed forces, also rapidly
increasing in number. The Bolsheviks even cooperated a bit with the Provisional Government, for example, by arranging strikes to
interfere with Kornilov at the time of his attempted putsch. And they worked on Pravda. But, for the most part, they kept under
cover, biding their time.
And then the Bolsheviks struck. In the early morning of October 24 (Old Calendar), it appeared that the Provisional Government
was preparing to restore some modicum of control. It closed the bridges. An emergency meeting of the Petrograd Soviet was
called. Lenin spoke; he would end the war with Germany; and allow the peasants to divide amongst themselves the remaining land
holdings of any size. But those appeals to popularity were an amuse bouche relative to his main message: when he also declared the
revolution an accomplished fact. He followed up that night with a statement: “State power has passed [to the] Petrograd Soviet [and
the Bolshevik-packed] Military-Revolutionary Committee.” The announcement was premature at the time of that initial speech,
but not by the time of the release of his statement, at 10 the next morning. In the course of the night, Bolshevik-sympathizing
military units had moved into town. Unopposed, they took over the key government buildings; and especially the meeting- place
of the Provisional Government. From these beginnings, in the vacuum of power left in the abdication of the Tsar, and during the
brief regime of the Duma, the Bolsheviks began their takeover: of all of Russia.
The Bolsheviks, with Lenin as their leader, brought to the table, a new graft on the story regarding what it meant to be Russian.
That story described how Russia would be run economically, civilly, and militarily. It was Dawn of A New Glorious Socialist Age.
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.1. Focusing attention
Now note how the narrative focuses our attention on particular events, linked through particular causal relations. This role
f narratives has important implications for our thoughts and actions, since it alerts us to future dangers and opportunities.
n particular, the narrative is telling us to be particularly wary of extremists in times when there is a power vacuum.
But the account tells us something even more important than this, namely, to be wary of the narratives of these extremists,
ince their narratives give them their potential power. Our account is actually a narrative within a narrative: The story about
he Bolshevik seizure of power contains the story that Lenin told about Russia’s destiny. It was Lenin’s story that enabled
im to mobilize the Russian workers. In accepting Lenin’s story, their attention became focused on setting up a dictatorship
f the proletariat that would lead to an ideal world where each would give according to his ability and take according to
is need. Centrally planned industrialization would have been impossible to initiate without a substantial body of people
eeking to make Lenin’s story a reality. Russian workers could have pursued many other objectives; it was  Lenin’s narrative
hat induced them to focus their attention on forcible achievement of power followed by a rigid industrialization drive.
Our narrative of Russian history enables us to focus on this particular aspect of Russian history. On April 3, 1917, it was
ar from clear that Lenin’s arrival at St. Petersburg’s Finland Station was particularly newsworthy. Only subsequent events
ade it so. With hindsight, we can focus our attention on developments that turned out to be consequential for what would
ecome the Soviet state and the terrible sacriﬁces it exacted from its citizens. With foresight, this was an impossible task.
Attention is commonly described as a sustained focusing of our cognitive resources on particular environmental stimuli,
ombined with a sustained neglect of extraneous stimuli. The neglect is as important as the focusing, for without the neglect
f extraneous stimuli, we would be unable to process the relevant information efﬁciently. Mainstream economic analysis,
y assuming that agents optimize their objective functions over their entire regions of feasible opportunities, ignores this
henomenon of neglect. It is a major oversight, since all conscious decisions (including the economic ones) are made only
ith respect to the possibilities that are in our attentional ﬁeld.7
Despite extensive analysis in psychology and neuroscience, there is still little consensus on how attention functions in
ur thinking and decision making processes. Kahneman (1973), for example, has proposed that we have a ﬁxed amount
f attentional resources, which can be divided among various objects of attention. Others (e.g. Navon and Gopher, 1979)
owever have observed that it is more difﬁcult to divide attention among tasks which share the same modality (such as
istening to a radio news program and a conversation at the same time, since these both share the auditory modality).
ome have noted a tradeoff between the size of the perceptual ﬁeld and the efﬁciency of cognitive processing: the wider
he focus, the longer the requisite processing time (e.g. Eriksen and St James, 1986; Castiello and Umilta, 1990). Yet others
ave emphasized the role of emotions, cognitive processing and automatization of tasks in the generation and allocation of
ttentional resources. Attention is also linked to working memory, where information is stored for future manipulation. The
nformation is selected for working memory partly through top-down sensitivity control (by higher cognitive processes)
nd partly by bottom-up saliency ﬁlters (automatic processes shaped by biological adaptation), so that attention can be
istinguished through its endogenous and exogenous sources. (See, for example, Knudsen (2007) and Pattyn et al. (2008).)
Such insights have far-reaching implications for economic analysis. Since, as noted, our conscious decisions are made
nly with respect to the objects of choice we are attending to, our decisions are shaped as much by our attentional ﬁeld
generally a small domain within the full set of feasible possibilities) as by the choices we make once the choice set has been
etermined. Those things that are in the center of our attentional ﬁeld have greater importance for our decisions than those
hings at the periphery. Kahneman calls this the “focusing illusion” – “Nothing in life is as important as you think it is when
ou’re thinking about it” (Kahneman, 2011(p. 402) and Wilson et al., 2000 call it “focalism”). It is the reason why  crippling
ccidents don’t leave paraplegics in a permanently bad mood: unless they suffer from chronic pain or severe depression,
heir attention reverts to what occupied them before their accidents. When people adapt to new situations, they do so by
ttending less to their previous concerns.
Our attentional ﬁeld is not the outcome of a utility maximization process, since we have only limited cognitive resources
o compare the outcomes of decision making based on alternative attentional ﬁelds. Instead, our attention is driven by
ther processes, largely unexplored in economic analysis thus far. For example, our attentional ﬁeld affects the content of
ur working memory, which in turn inﬂuences the selection of new information for our attentional ﬁeld (see, for example,
attyn et al. (2008)). This reﬂexive loop makes our attentional ﬁeld path-dependent. Our attention also depends on the
xternal stimuli we face. For example, we are sensitive to unusual stimuli and those to which we have an instinctive or
earned response.
In addition and importantly, our attention is affected by our emotions and motivations. The evolutionary reasons for this
re apparent. Since our conscious behavior is driven by our motivations, it is clearly useful for our attentional resources to
e focused on what we are doing. Furthermore, emotions (linked to our motivations, but distinct from them) are a quick
hannel whereby we gain insights from our environment: a growling dog running our way will evoke fear and thereby focus
ur attention on options to ﬂee. Emotions are also a quick way to gain insights from others: through emotional contagion,
or example, we are quickly infected by the fear of our companions in response to a common threat, to which our atten-
7 Behavioral economics has implicitly touched on perceptual neglect in the context of framing and mental accounting, but there has been little research
hus  far on the mechanisms and determinants of attention.
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tion becomes directed. Furthermore, in the many situations in which economic actions become self-fulﬁlling prophecies,
emotional contagion – together with the resulting harmonization of attentional focus – offers the opportunity of beneﬁting
quickly from such prophecies.
These determinants of attention clearly play an important role in economic decision making, but have received little
attention in mainstream economics. Mainstream analysis also ignores the role of attention in making sense of our envi-
ronment. We  understand our environment not just by ﬁtting the available data to the given frame (our attentional ﬁeld),
but also by adjusting the frame. Our decisions arise from the interplay between data-ﬁtting and frame-ﬁtting. (Mainstream
economics focuses on the former.) This two-way ﬁtting process is in the spirit of the sense-making theory of Klein et al.
(2006) and the Recognition-Metacognition model (Cohen et al., 1996).
The roles that attention play in economic decision making alerts us to the importance of narratives, since narratives are
– as we have seen – an effective device for focusing attention.
4. Fast forward
George Akerlof remembers seeing the consequences of Lenin’s vision at the very end of the Soviet period. It was 1990, the time
of Gorbachev’s Perestroika; and he was invited to Moscow. He remembers going to GUM, Moscow’s famous leading department
store. He should have been prepared for what he saw, since he had read about it many times, and seen it in pictures, but in the
ﬂesh it was even more impressive. The store was full of shelves swept bare, spotlessly clean. In addition, some shelves were full to
the brim. These full shelves contained items no one would want to buy, such as the colorful pins he purchased for his nine-year-old
son, back home in America. Some twenty years later, he discovered them in a closet, unused, but dangerously rusty. There was an
elementary reason for this combination of empty and full shelves. For Soviet Planners, the price of an item was an after-thought.
If the price was set too low, demand would exceed supply, and the shelves would be empty. If the price was set too high, the
supply would exceed demand; and the shelves would, most of the time, be full. This is the clearest evidence he had ever seen of the
fundamental economic principle that when price is too low, demand will exceed supply.
Luckily, he was guided in his visit by a leading young American expert on the Soviet economy, Richard Ericson, who explained
easily the essence of Soviet planning. Almost all production and exchange—in agriculture, retailing, and industry—was state
controlled.
Production and delivery were determined by The Plan. Whatever its complexities, the essence of Soviet planning was remarkably
simple. The Plan was a long list of commands to deliver. The prices were an after-thought, set independently, at what the goods
were “worth” (see Ericson, 1991).
This system, which owed itself to the Marxist conception of a Plan worked remarkably badly. In the ﬁrst instance, those empty
shelves took a terrible toll on the consumer. It meant that every housewife was  in constant desperation to get what she needed. As
soon as a desired item was stocked, word of mouth would be passed that meat, for example, was available. The line would lengthen
until the cost of waiting made it only worthwhile, at the margin, to get the good.
But that huge inefﬁciency was just the beginning of why  the system worked so very badly, because the command economy did
not just determine what went to the retail stores. It also described the exchange of goods among producers. Thus for example, the
Plan would command the Smolensk Revolutionary Glass Works to deliver to Lada People’s Automobile Works 50,000 square feet
of glass on January 17, 1985; the characteristics of the glass; and the price Lada would pay. Neither Lada nor Smolensk was  free
to decline. But then, if the glass did not ﬁt, how could Lada fulﬁll its prescribed Plan delivery of 1,734 cars dictated by the Plan to
Tbilisi on, say, June 17?8 A story going around Moscow in 1990 indicates the systematic mismatch between quality-desired/quality-
delivered, as it also tells us how the Soviets managed to muddle through. In the late 1980’s, a Portuguese company, optimistic about
Russian Glasnost (openness), ordered some carloads of glass. But when the glass arrived, it was broken. The Russian administrators
who had taken the order were surprised: no one had ever complained before. Previous recipients of glass had expected it to be
broken; they had all wanted the beautiful birch in the packing.
Prices might not be used as incentives, but the State had auxiliary methods of obtaining cooperation. More than 20 central
committees subsidiary to the Plan, mediated so that the right type and quality of “glass” would be delivered to the right destination.
But one agency, not on that ofﬁcial list, juiced up the incentives. This was the Secret Police. For a plan that was not working, there
was at hand a simple explanation. The Plan was sacrosanct; it could not be wrong. Instead, as explanation, the Secret Police would
ﬁnd sabotage by counterrevolutionary bourgeois elements. Even the highest government ofﬁcial was not immune from the Secret
Police. In 1946 Lavrenti Beria was demoted from Commissar of the Secret Police (the NKVD) because Stalin feared him; but since
Beria was a model of efﬁciency he was transferred, to head the Russian Atomic Bomb Project. The successful Soviet nuclear test of
1949 saved at least one life: Beria’s, at least for the moment. Through the Secret Police, he was later dispatched by the triumvirate
who took over after Stalin, who, likewise, also feared him.
8 This example is in line with Ericson’s example (1991, p. 18) of a ball-bearing factory. He gives more detail, regarding how the ball-bearing factory would
muddle through, meeting its own goals as best it could, to the inconvenience of those down the line
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.1. Predicting events
Our story illustrates how narratives help us predict events. By bringing particular causal relations to our attention, they
nable us to infer how one set of events leads to another. Predictions may  be understood as causal implications, including but
ot necessarily restricted to implications for future events. (For example, a theory of evolution or cosmology may  successfully
redict events that occurred in the past.)
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to causality underlying prediction. The ﬁrst is the classical approach, accord-
ng to which causes are determinate entities that exist independently of our minds and bodies, providing an objectively
scertainable causal link to the associated effects. This approach is recognized to be fraught with intractable difﬁculties, ﬁrst
dentiﬁed by David Hume, who noted that the mere occurrence of an event never deductively implies that another event
ill occur, but that induction is never sufﬁcient to justify the assumption that past associations of events will continue in
he future. Attempting to justify the assumption by appeals to past experience are, in Hume’s words, like “going in a circle,
nd taking that for granted, which is the very point in question” (Hume, 1748, p. 23).
The second approach to causality is the one that Hume proposed in response to his problem of induction, namely, that
ausation is based on a primitive psychological disposition that he called “custom”, whereby we  make empirical predictions
ithout rational justiﬁcation. Without the inﬂuence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact, beyond
hat is immediately present to the memory and senses (Hume, 1748, p. 29). Research in psychology and neuroscience has
hed light on how we make sense of our world through our perceptual interaction with and bodily manipulation of our
nvironment. We  organize our perceptions into uniﬁed wholes, through which our experience takes on a discernible order.
e interact with our environment through the exertion of force, which we direct on other objects or they direct on us. This
s an origin of our sense of causality, linking the sources and targets of force.
While statistical models follow the ﬁrst approach, they do not account for our intuitive understanding of the causal forces
nderlying the predictions on which most of our interactions with our environment are based. Empirical observations,
alsiﬁable hypotheses and repeatable experiments may  help shape our inductive inferences, but they can neither prove the
xistence of causal relations nor wholly explain what makes these inferences psychologically compelling. The underlying
roblem is that our hypotheses are frequently “not identiﬁed,” in the sense that the available evidence is insufﬁcient to
etermine uniquely what beliefs are to be held on it. Furthermore, many of our decisions are made under circumstances
hat cannot be construed as replicable experiments. Then inductive inferences are not appropriate.
But since we must continually make predictions in order to interact with our environment in ways that are meaningful
o us, it is important to investigate how we become convinced of our predictions. The degree of conviction depends on more
han statistical properties. Determinants of conviction (for an excellent overview, see Tuckett (2015)) include (a) coverage
f the narrative (the degree to which it accounts for the available evidence); (b) the emotions that the narrative evokes
somatic markers); (c) the degree to which a narrative reduces anxiety or promotes positive feelings; (d) the plausibility and
onsistency of the narrative; (e) the perceived completeness of the narrative (in terms of perceived access to information,
Priester et al., 2007); (f) the speed of narrative processing and retrieval (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman, 1973); (g) the degree
o which the narrative is supported by other explanations of a phenomenon and attitude consistent beliefs (Wood, 1982);
h) the ease with which narrative patterns are recognized (as in the recognition heuristic of Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)
nd Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002)); (i) the novelty of the narrative (Burnstein and Vinokur, 1975); (j) the degree of trust in
thers who profess to believe a narrative (Barbalet, 2011); (k) the degree to which the information underlying the narrative
s perceived to have been collected in a thoughtful and thorough manner (as in the thoughtfulness heuristic of Barden and
etty (2008)); and (l) the degree to which the narrative is in accord with existing social norms and conventions (e.g. Tormala
t al., 2007).
Narratives have an important role to play in generating conviction in our predictions. According to Tuckett (2013), convic-
ion narratives are narratives that generate sufﬁcient conviction for their underlying predictions to provide the psychological
ustiﬁcation for action. Such justiﬁcation is required in contexts of radical uncertainty, where one action cannot be objectively
emonstrated to be preferable to others. Conviction narratives are relevant to our actions; and they generate conﬁdence in
he accuracy of their predictions.
The narrative above illustrates the role of a narrative in making predictions and generating conﬁdence in these predictions.
n particular, it highlights the elements of central planning which may  be expected to lead to excess supplies and demands.
hese surpluses and deﬁcits are empirical regularities that induce conviction through coverage, plausibility, consistency,
ompleteness and perceived thoughtfulness. The narrative is also easily recognized and retrieved, in accord with the beliefs
nd conventional wisdoms in market economies.
Mainstream economic analysis gives no role for narratives to play in predicting events, aside from narratives that ratio-
alize ex post the results of economic models. Such narratives are at best convenient ways of recalling and communicating
mpirical results; they are neither a complement nor a substitute for the underlying statistical analysis. An important reason
or the irrelevance of narratives in mainstream economics is that the latter deals almost exclusively with decision making
nder risk (whereby the probability distributions of all random variables are assumed to be known) rather than under
ncertainty (whereby these distributions are unknown).
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5. The ﬁrst turn of the ratchet
An episode from the late 1920’s/early 1930’s shows the extreme dysfunction of Soviet Planning. After the Revolution, the
Bolsheviks initially dealt with their problems pragmatically—with moderate success. They had won the Civil War  by 1919; two
years later they had negotiated a stalemate truce in a territorial war with Poland. Back at home in the early-to mid-1920’s, they
grew the economy under the “New Economic Policy.” That policy walked on two legs. The ﬁrst leg included the bureaucracy (largely
taken over from the Tsar), and the nationalized industries. The second leg was free-market, including most small-scale business
and retailing, and almost all of agriculture. Grain production by 1925–1926 had come back to pre-War levels (Conquest, 1987, p.
70); industrial output also expanded rapidly.
But time was passing, and the Bolsheviks were in a hurry to reach that next stage of history.9 The First Five Year Plan accorded
with those ambitions. Over its ﬁve years, from 1928 to 1933, industry was to grow by 236 percent and labor productivity by 110
percent (Kuromiya, 1988). Agriculture also had a place in the scheme. Much of the peasantry would be transplanted to collective
farms: kolkhozes. Just as giant new factories would mechanize the industrial workplace, these giant new farms would mechanize
agriculture. Each kolkhoz would be assigned a Tractor Station—where, Carshare-style, the collective would get tractors for plowing
and planting according to need. Those tractors would, of course, be the products of the new industrialization. It was a grand vision:
Industry would feed tractors to agriculture. Agriculture would feed bread to industry. It was a great leap forward to a new socialist
reality.
But the best-laid plans of mice and men do not always work out as planned. Let’s consider what ensued in the Ukraine, the
bread-basket of the Soviet Union. We  have already seen Soviet planning as a long list, with each line of the list taking the form:
commodity X to be delivered to entity Y at place W at time T. The First Five Year Plan had a line on that delivery list that was more
important than any other. The non-agricultural workforce needed to eat. The plan would not work if the grain to feed them was
not collected and delivered from the farms to the cities.
The problems of those deliveries began small, but then escalated. In the spring of 1928, the government overestimated the
amount of grain that would be offered by the peasants to the market, still in existence under the New Economic Policy. The
government in Moscow decided to seize the estimated 2 million ton shortfall. This was not a huge exaction out of total production
of about 75 million tons (Conquest, 1970, p. 70).
But the method of extraction, easily accomplished in physical terms,10 was ham-handed. In that spring of 1928 the extraction
took the form of village self-taxation (Conquest, 1970, p. 90). Votes in the village communes would determine how much the village
would “voluntarily” contribute. In each case there was a vote. But that vote could not be described as democratic. First of all, most
of the richer peasants, who were also the likely village leaders, were disenfranchised (Conquest, 1970, p. 90). Consistent with the
Leninist view that the minority might really be the majority, it took only one third of those present to determine the outcome.
There was a further constraint on how the vote should be decided: the wrong decision by the commune would be “deemed
contrary to Soviet Policy.” Part of that policy was heavy exaction from the richer peasants: known as the kulaks. Lest anyone
misunderstand how participants were meant to vote, the commune meetings were attended by the Communist cadres responsible
for collecting the grain. The secret police were also there: to witness who voted how. The threat was  obvious: bread or bullets.
These forced exactions easily achieved their immediate goal of ending the 1928 shortfall, but not without implication for the
future. Signiﬁcantly, the cost of planting the crops exceeded what the farmers would receive in payment (Conquest, 1970, p. 92).
If a farmer’s additional output was especially liable to conﬁscation, he had then a negative incentive to plant. It should then be no
surprise that when the 1928 harvest came in, the shortfall was not the fairly mild 2 million tons of before; it was much greater.
This was just the ﬁrst turn of the ratchet. By Soviet Marxist logic, the fault could not be with the plan. And, if not due to the plan,
it must be due to sabotage, by class enemies. The prime suspects out there in the villages were the richer peasants: the kulaks. They
must be hoarding the grain that was the rightful property of the Soviet Government.
5.1. Motivating action
It is amply clear that the Bolshevik narrative motivated collective actions that would not have been performed without
the purposes and justiﬁcations that the narrative provided. Speciﬁcally, the narrative changed the direction of people’s
economic decisions, for a given set of economic constraints (such as the input-output structure of the Soviet economy).
Under a different narrative, Lenin’s New Economic Policy would have continued beyond 1928, with agricultural and small-
scale industrial production moving increasingly into private hands. By invoking the Bolshevik narrative, it became possible
to motivate millions of people to follow a different course. Although the Soviet secret police obviously played an essential
role in coercing industrialization, in the absence of the Soviet narrative there would have been no rationale for coercion and
thus no basis for the voluntarily supportive and permissive participation by many Soviet citizens, which was  critical at least
to get the forced industrialization started.Mainstream economics permits consideration of altered directions in economic decision making, for given constraints,
only through the notion of preference changes and changes of circumstance (supply shocks). Such preference changes and
supply shocks are generally considered exogenously given, lying beyond the purview of economic analysis. Our story shows
9 A successful plan would also fortify the Soviet Union against threat from the anti-Communist West.
10 In fact there was  an over-delivery of 5 million tons. Conquest, 1970 p. 90.
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ramatically, however, further reasons why the direction of economic decisions may  change, and also may  do so suddenly,
ffecting large numbers of people, in accord with broadly rational principles of reason, with profound implications for the
ourse of economic activities. Viewing such preference changes as exogenous implies that economic analysis ceases to
ccount for the most important economic events in Soviet history. Viewing them as endogenous but gradual also fails to
ccount for these events. In short, the account of Soviet industrialization in the late 1920s illustrates the need to recognize
he existence of multiple motivations, each associated with a different direction for economic decision making. This insight
s elaborated in recent work on motivation-driven economics (see Przyrembel et al., 2015), whose basic insight is that all
ehavior is motivated and that humans have access to discrete, multiple motivation systems.
In particular, all behavior is the product of forces in an organism to initiate, energize and direct its behavior. Simply
nowing the person’s goals and constraints is not sufﬁcient to determine the person’s behavior. A depressed person, for
xample, may  have goals that can be satisﬁed, but no motivation to satisfy them. Knowing a person’s needs is also not
ufﬁcient to produce behavior. An anorexic person may  need food, but lack the motivation to eat it. In addition to goals
nd needs, we require a drive that stimulates, controls and sustains a particular behavior pattern. A motive inﬂuences the
irection, intensity and persistence of a behavior pattern. Each motive is associated with a distinct objective. The motive is,
n effect, the drive that propels the organism toward achievement of an ultimate goal.
The multiple, discrete motivation systems to which we  have access are biological systems that activate our emotions,
odulate our perceptions, and stimulate our motor responses. Przyrembel et al. (2015) identify seven motivation systems
hat are particularly signiﬁcant for economic decision making: Resource-Seeking, Care, Afﬁliation, Status-Seeking, Achieve-
ent, Threat Avoidance and Threat Approach. These motivation systems are associated with different behavioral tendencies
hat, respectively, can be denoted as self-interested, prosocial, conforming, competitive, excelling, defensive and aggressive
ehaviors, each of which is associated with a distinct objective. The activation of different motivation systems is the outcome
f the interplay between the person’s characteristics (e.g. transient conditions of the internal environment, such as hormone
nd blood sugar levels, and persistent conditions such as personality), the person’s external environment and her appraisal
f this environment.
Narratives inﬂuence a person’s appraisal of her environment, e.g. a shortfall in agricultural output available for industrial
orkers was viewed as evidence of sabotage by the kulaks. Narratives also affect a person’s social environment, by coor-
inating the actions of various population groups in pursuit of a common goal. Thereby narratives lead to the activation of
istinct motivation systems, aimed at distinct objectives.
. Death by hunger
The next escalation was to expropriate the kulaks. That began with such actions as exorbitant ﬁnes on those deemed short in
heir deliveries. The size of the ﬁnes was only the ﬁrst reason why they drove the offenders into bankruptcy.11 Those arbitrary
ommune meetings, with the Communist cadres and the secret police insisting on self-enforced taxation, had not just determined
ow much the village would pay, but also who would pay it within the village; no procedure guaranteed any fair relation between
he grain a family grew and its exaction. And so the ﬁnes were typically back-breaking (Conquest, 1987, p. 101).
But they were just the beginning of the dekulakization. When the harvest of 1929 failed, as would have been suspected, yet
ore forceful measures had to be taken against the saboteurs: the grain-hoarding kulaks. In January 1929 The Party resolved that
,065,000 “kulak” families, with about 5,000,000 persons would be divided into three groups (Conquest, 1987, p. 121). Group I
about 100,000 families) would be shot; Group II (about 150,000) would be sent to remote areas such as Siberia; and Group III, a
it more mercifully, deported to marginal land in their own  district (Conquest, 1987, p. 120). This policy made no sense from any
oint of view: even by the standards of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The kulaks were presumed to be rich. But after the land reforms
f the Tsar, and the subsequent redistribution of the Revolution, a peasant would distinguish himself merely by the ownership of a
orse, or perhaps of one or two cows. He might be designated a “kulak” for hiring additional labor for a short time to gather in the
arvest. Or he might just be denounced by those who controlled the commune meeting, in need of a scapegoat, or happy to settle
n ancient score. But, even wholly discounting these inconvenient truths, this policy still made no sense. The richer peasants may
ave only owned the extra horse or cow, but still they did produce more than their share of the grain; 3 to 5 percent produced
ome 20 percent of the grain (Conquest, 1987, p. 75). Dekulak the countryside and the collection of that grain for the plan would
e far more difﬁcult in subsequent harvests. And so it proved.
Exactly the same techniques for getting the villagers to self-tax, to identify who would self-tax, to get them to identify those
ho needed to be dekulaked, were used in getting them also to vote to collectivize. The local Bolsheviks cadres would be present
t the meetings. The votes were not secret. Those who voted the wrong way would be shot, or sent off cattle-style to the prison
amps. In remarkably short order, with remarkable efﬁciency we might say, by the 1931 planting season most of the Ukraine (and
ost of the rest of the Soviet Union) was collectivized.
And now disaster occurred: in two stages. The ﬁrst stage was the ﬁrst harvest. The disorder involved in collectivization naturallyeduced output. Any family that has recently moved will understand why. But there was a more immediate cause. Those moving
nto the collectives had little (or no) reason to take their property with them. If they had a horse, it would be better to sell it, for
hat it would fetch. If that was not possible, it would make one last good meal before a bleak future. There was further reason to
11 Kulaks, with 5 times the earnings of poorer peasants were assessed 30 times the taxes. The kulaks were taxed at 30–40 percent of production.
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get rid of that horse, or that cow, before the move. It was bad enough to be a kulak before collectivization. Once collectivization
had occurred, that horse, or that cow, would especially stick out. Furthermore, in the Plan’s brave new world, horses would not be
necessary. The ﬁelds would be gloriously plowed with the new tractors from the tractor-share stations.
But the reality of the tractor stations was different from the dream. Often they were miles away. More than that, the promised
tractors were not likely to be working. The planners had not adequately foreseen the need for repair. That repair was especially
needed since the tractors themselves were the result of the same non-working plan that produced the non-working farms. But
whatever the role of no-horses/no-tractors, the disruption of the collectivization itself—fast and forced as it was—would have been
sufﬁcient to dramatically reduce production. It was inevitable that the harvest of 1931 was extremely bad.
In a normal society such a small harvest would result in smaller exaction from the peasants. That’s what granaries are for. It’s
also when governments give up foreign exchange (or, nowadays, go to the World Bank or to the IMF) to get it from Kansas. But
the plan was unbending: just as the Russian leader called himself “Steel.” Since the plan could not be wrong, once again it must be
those kulaks: with their hoarding and sabotage transmogriﬁed onto the collective farms. The grain deliveries were sacrosanct. So
the Communist cadres went out in search. Their bayonets would even poke into haystacks, even into niches of the peasants’ hovels,
seeking even the smallest stashes of grain. A collective that had not met its levy was guilty of defrauding the Soviet government.
Any food that was found was conﬁscated. If farmers are sufﬁciently hungry they eat the seed for the next season. The 1931 harvest
was bad, but the 1932 harvest would be far, far worse. How would the people make it through the coming year? A very signiﬁcant
fraction did not. We  do not know how many died. Whole villages were wiped out, where, gruesomely, everyone starved. For many,
the corpses of those who had gone before provided their last supper. There is a vast range of estimates regarding how many died in
the Ukraine, with the mid-range of about 5,000,000 out of a rural population of 25,000,000. But even then the collection of grain at
gunpoint continued. In this regard the plan had no ﬂexibility. In Ukraine the famine is called the Holodomor—the death by hunger.
6.1. Social assignments and identities
It is striking how the Soviet narrative assigned different social roles to people on the basis of characteristics that became
signiﬁcant only in the context of that narrative: party members versus regular citizens, kulaks versus poorer peasants,
peasants versus industrial workers. These social roles divide people into distinct social groups. Each group has its own social
norms (embodying the group’s expectations regarding appropriate attitudes and behavior patterns) and ideals (describing
exemplary attitudes and behaviors). Living up to these social norms and ideals often comes with extrinsic rewards and
violating these norms elicits extrinsic punishments. The values of the group are commonly internalized by its members,
supplementing or replacing the external reinforcements and sanctions. Members of a group feel the need to afﬁliate and
conform. Social groups are also characterized by their degree of tolerance for deviations from their norms and ideals.
Social groups generate their own social identities, each of which may  be described in terms of distinctive characteristics
shared by members of a group. Identities play an important role in guiding behavior, since people who recognize themselves
as belonging to the same social group have an incentive to cooperate in pursuit of common goals. The pressure to afﬁliate
and conform may  take the form of normative inﬂuence (the desire to receive acceptance and approval from other group
members) and informational inﬂuence (in ambiguous situations). Furthermore, recognition of differences in group afﬁliation
leads to less cooperation and sometimes to conﬂict.
Bruner (1986, 1990) argues that we understand the world in two  ways: the paradigmatic mode of thought (in which
we explain our experience in terms of empirical observation and rigorous reasoning) and the narrative mode (in which we
understand events in terms of people’s motives and intentions). Narratives are a primary way  whereby we  make sense of
our social world. This process begins early in life: children commonly use narratives to explore their relations to others
and to investigate other’s perspectives. Thereby narratives become crucial to the shaping of identities. Our sensitivity to
narrative provides the major link between our own  sense of self and our sense of others in the social world around us
(Bruner, 1986). Narratives are also an important instrument for personal integration, since we generally make sense of
our lives in terms of a single, unfolding story. It is common for people to revise their narrative accounts of themselves in
terms of their current experience. Our sense of identity, as conveyed through narrative, is context-dependent (shaped by
our external environment), interpersonal (described in terms of our interrelations with others), intersubjective (generally
in need of corroboration by others in our social groups) and emergent (in response to largely unforeseen circumstances).
Mainstream economics ignores the role of narratives in generating and maintaining identities since it assumes that
preferences are located exclusively in the individual; the inﬂuence of social groups on individual preferences is ignored.
This gap is ﬁlled by identity economics (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2010), which explores how people’s decisions are
inﬂuenced by the norms and ideals of their social groups.
7. Lessons of the Holodomor
The usual lesson economists take from the Soviet experience concerns the inefﬁciencies of State Planning. We  agree. But we
also take away another, deeper lesson, concerning the importance of stories. Lenin’s great bequeathal to the Soviet State was his
story about the road ahead. The Holodomor did not just happen because of the Plan; it also happened because the cadres accepted
that story. Thus, in the villages the cadres were willing to encamp, or to shoot, the innocent. They did so because they were forced
to do so; but they were also willing to carry it through because they believed in the promise of socialist bliss; and, furthermore,
following Lenin, they believed that moderation in pursuit of that goal was no virtue, as extremism was no vice. That lesson concerns
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he Soviet Union. But the deeper, more general lesson concerns a warning the Soviet experience gives to us, who have the good
ortune of living in saner times and in saner places. We  too live by our stories, and those stories are not always benign. Our social
nd economic system gives us, thankfully, much less opportunity for going wrong. But insofar as it does, we too should always be
ooking over our shoulders to check whether the stories we are telling ourselves, which are responsible for our decisions, give us
hat we really want.
.1. Power relationships and social norms
The social roles associated with distinctive identities bring people into predeﬁned and predictable social relations with
ne another, such as parent-child, teacher-student and Party ofﬁcial-regular comrade. These social relations imply distinctive
ower relationships.
Power, in terms of the potential to exert inﬂuence, can be generated in various ways: perceived control over others’
ewards and punishments, social identiﬁcation, expertise (being perceived as knowledgeable by others), and legitimacy
being perceived as having the right to inﬂuence). Whereas some power arises from the actual ability to control resources, it
s common for power to depend on perceptions by others. Narratives are the organizing principles shaping such perceptions.
or example, perceptions of competence and legitimacy often depend on socially conferred status characteristics that might
ot be relevant to the domain wherein power is exercised.
Power relationships may  be established and maintained through the pressures of social conformity (e.g. Asch, 1955),
bedience to authority (e.g. Milgram, 1964) and compliance (e.g. Freedman and Fraser, 1966). These relationships are often
riven by a variety of motives, such as Afﬁliation, Status-Seeking, Threat Avoidance and Threat Approach. Whereas these
elationships are often essential for maintaining people’s cooperation in social groups, they may  also lead to destructive
utcomes, as our account of Soviet history illustrates. Starting with the Milgram experiments, there has been much research
n why people tend to be obedient to authority, even when it manifestly causes signiﬁcant harm. Narratives conferring
egitimacy and expertise to particular social groups or ones that induce people to identify with authority play an important
ole in this regard.
Since narratives have a tree-like structure, they develop branches. This makes people highly manipulable, as much of
he game of life is to graft branches favorable to us onto other people’s narrative trees, as they also seek to graft branches
nto our narratives that are favorable to them. Power relationships often arise from these grafting activities. Mainstream
conomics ignores this role of narratives, since it does not consider the power relations derived from the interplay among
ocial groups.
Last, but far from least, narratives serve another social function. They convey social norms and help explain why norms
hould be obeyed and under what circumstances violators of norms are to be punished (see, for example, R. Akerlof, 2015).
he Bible, for example, is made up of many narratives, and serves all of these functions.
The function of social norms is to induce people to cooperate in order to achieve a common goal. They are meant to
egulate social relationships. In our evolutionary history, such norms often enhanced the survival prospects of the norm
ollowers in multifarious ways. However, as the narrative above shows, social norms can also lead to detrimental social
utcomes. Mainstream economic theory ignores social relationships and thus has no place for social norms. Behavioral
conomics, when concerned with norms, generally makes room for them by including them in reasonably stable utility
unctions. While Mancur Olson (1965) asserted that rational, self-interested individuals would not contribute to common
oods, Elinor Ostrom 2014 (elsewhere) showed how social norms may  evolve, permitting people to overcome such collective
ction problems. Others have investigated how social norms enable people to cooperate in the absence of formal property
ight systems and centralized allocation mechanisms, in particular through promoting the establishment of reputations and
anctions, whose effectiveness tends to be strengthened through parochialism (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, 1998).12
The exposition above goes further by illustrating how narratives provide a social context within which social norms
ecome explicable, as well as desirable as goals of individual behavior. Narratives not only rationalize norms in terms of
imple scripts whereby people can easily recall their meaningfulness, but also specify the circumstances under which they
re to be applied. Narratives also provide reasons for why  norm-enforcement should have normative force and under what
ircumstances. In short, narratives do not just specify norms of behavior, but also provide application principles that are
mbedded in particular social relationships.13
In the Soviet narrative, the Communist story conveyed strict social norms, concerning not only material accumulation,
ut also dress, manners, political rituals, forms of personal address highlighting both an egalitarian ideal and authority
elationships within Soviet society, and much more. By articulating the goal of socialist bliss, the narrative explained why
oviet citizens were required to follow these norms and why  they needed to spy on violators and bring them to Soviet
ustice. Without this social role of the Soviet narrative, it would have been impossible for the Bolsheviks to gain power and
xtremely unlikely for them to have maintained it later on.
12 The role of sanctions in norm enforcement has received much attention recently (e.g. Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
13 On this account, people may  follow conﬂicting norms, driven by conﬂicting narratives, but applied to different social circumstances. (For an analogous
rgument with regard to moral values, see Rai and Fiske, 2011.)
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8. Concluding remarks
The various roles of narratives discussed above have important implications for economic decisions. In order to take
account of these roles, mainstream economics needs to be extended in the following respects:
• Narratives enable people to make sense of their environments by providing simple mental models of causal relations that
focus their attention on particular variables and lead them to make particular predictions.
• All behavior is motivated in the sense that individuals have access to multiple, discrete motivations, each associated with
a different objective. Narratives play a role in activating motivations.
• Different social contexts also activate different motives. Narratives assign social roles and build identities.
• Thereby narratives help establish and maintain power relationships.
This framework of thought has the following implications, conﬂicting with traditional economic analysis: An individual’s
objectives are not unique, since the individual can draw on multiple motivations, associated with different objectives. An indi-
vidual’s objectives need not be internally coherent across motives. An individual’s objectives are not context-independent,
since contexts play a role in activating motivations. An individual’s objectives are not exclusively self-interested, since the
individual is concerned about her relationships to others, shaped by her identities. An individual’s objectives need not be
temporally stable, since motives may  change quickly through time. An individual’s environment is generally not deter-
minate, since the individual generally has access to multiple interpretations of her environment, with no unambiguous
objective criteria for deﬁning the environment. An individual’s environment is generally not objectively observable, since
the individual is active in construction of this environment. Individuals are not means-end rational since they use only their
attended-to means to achieve their attended-to ends.
These implications open up important roles for narratives to play in economic decision making. In particular, since people’s
environments are not determinate and objectively observable, narratives can play a role in deﬁning these environments.
Furthermore, narratives inﬂuence the objectives of people’s activities, for any given appraisal of the environments.
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